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When the princess kissed the frog, he turned into a prince and they lived happily ever after. 
Well quite happily - as the sequel tells. The frog had an identity crisis. Was he a frog or a 
prince? He set out to find his true identity.i Like all great stories, the frog prince deals with 
the eternal questions.  
  How much are we trapped by biology, limited and defined by our bodies, our genes, and 
how much can we live beyond these seeming limits? 
  How much can we achieve by our own efforts and with other people's help, and how much 
do we have to rely on other powers - science, genetics or magic? 
  How much does our state at birth determine who we are and will become? 
  How much does our behaviour, even our appearance, reflect the attitudes of other people, 
such as love or rejection, and their beliefs about us? 
  There are many stories of ugly lonely `beasts' who, when they are loved turn into 
handsome heroes. How much are we really our `worst' or our `best' sides? 
 
Words and meanings 
 
Everyone tells stories - their versions or accounts of raw experience. Science is often seen 
as a way of escaping from stories and telling neutral `truths' or `facts'. But like all other 
accounts, scientific ones have to use language which is loaded with complex meanings and 
values as much as fairy stories are. Genetic `information' or `facts' are complicated by:  
*  uncertainties - about how pronounced the condition might be; 
*  speculation - about the way each child's life might be affected by a genetic condition or by 
other influences; 
*  value judgements about which lives are worth living, and who counts as a human being, 
such as in the efforts put into developing and marketing the triple test; 
*  `geneticization'ii a great emphasis on biology and technology - genes, mapping the 
genome, antenatal screening and selection, hopes of genetic engineering, methods of 
controlling and preventing `problems' - with under attention to relevant social concerns;  
*  anxiety about risk and responsibility, control and blame, and sometimes irrational guilt 
about genetic events which are beyond our control; 
*  under-estimation of human resourcefulness and community, when we jointly confront and 
live with difficulty and disability  - as we almost all have to do in old age; 
*  a tendency to inflate genetic influences - many genetic disorders hardly affect daily life, 
many are extremely rare, with many defects only a few of the people that have them are 
severely affected. Yet it is often implied that genetic disorders are extremely numerous, and 
generally very severe, and each affects large numbers of people. Among the general public 
who do not belong to genetic interest groups or work in genetics but have quite serious 
genetic disorders, how many of them think of themselves as having faulty genes like 
defective machines? How many carriers think of themselves as carrying a time bomb 
waiting to explode in later generations? Do people generally perceive themselves in these 
consciously technical mechanistic terms?   
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  All these complications can affect the way people talk about genetics with children - and 
with anyone else of any age. Most of this chapter applies to all age groups. Complications 
may be highlighted when talking with children but they are not unique to them. This is not a 
`how to' chapter or a manual, which could imply that talking with children, like baking a cake, 
will turn out right if you follow the recipe. Instead, they are very varied and unpredictable 
agents in their own right, partners in discussions even when they refuse to talk. This chapter 
is mainly about stepping back and looking at some of the underlying complications which 
have to be dealt with at some level, especially when talking with people who are very 
intimately affected by genetic conditions. The main areas covered in this chapter consider 
communication in relation to risk, contradictions, timing and content, children's competence, 
and methods and barriers when talking with children. 
 
Risk in talking with children 
 
As discussed in a later chapter (Genetics and the social context) certain strong themes in 
the way we think about genetics resonate with many other aspects of life, including the task 
of talking about genetics with children. Some of these themes can heighten concern about 
risk. There is the feeling that `we ought to get it right', that complex information should be 
clear and also correct, that information will raise the child's anxiety. Yet at the same time 
there is also the feeling that anxiety should somehow be managed and relieved. Besides 
coping with these contradictory aims, the adults' hopes to `get it right' are inevitably 
accompanied with worry about `getting it wrong', about being incorrect, or giving too much 
or too little information for the child's good. 
  Subconsciously, other trends in genetics might increase the informant's anxiety: quests for 
high standards of research and knowledge, and for the `perfect child'; the assumption that 
some pregnancies should be terminated because coping with the consequences would be 
too hard for the parents and potential child; the desire to protect people from suffering; lack 
of confidence in their ability to cope with difficulty. People who are strongly guided by such 
assumptions are likely to see talking with children as risky. 
  Adults with greater confidence about sharing knowledge with children are less worried that 
there is a`correct' method. They are less anxious about taking risks and making mistakes, 
trusting that they will learn from children's responses and with them work out appropriate 
ways of sharing knowledge, recovering from blunders, and coping together with confusing, 
uncertain and distressing information. They have confidence in children's resilience and 
resourcefulness. 
  Decades ago, when four (fictional) children wanted to go camping and sailing on their own, 
their father agreed saying, `Better drowned than duffers, if not duffers, won't drown'.iii Today 
he would probably be imprisoned for negligence. Western society is becoming increasingly 
anxious about risk, blame and litigation; it is almost impossible to have an accident when 
every event can be seen as someone's `fault'.iv Starting with a nominal range for 1970, 
Figure 1 shows each decade moving more activities into the careful, cautious or fearful 
categories, increasing ascriptions of responsibility and potential blame. 
   
Figure 1.  A more risk-conscious society 
 
When talking with a child, adults need to reflect on how they feel about and present, for 
example, the possibility of the child as a carrier passing on a genetic condition to the next 
generation: as fearful and to be avoided at all costs, or as requiring caution, or as a risk that 
is worth taking and acceptable whatever happens. When parents say that one benefit in 
warning their teenage son about genetic risk is that it will inhibit his sexual relationships, is 
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this really in their son's best interests, now and in the long term, that he should be controlled 
by fear, rather than by his own sense of responsibility? What might the effects be on his 
sense of his present and future identity? Do warnings that place information in the right 
hand column (in figure 1) serve parents' interests rather than their child's?  
 
Contradictions 
 
Figure 2 shows how modern genetics is caught within social ideals which contradict and yet 
also reinforce one another. People grappling with these conflicts can feel that their aims and 
values are being pulled apart by opposing forces, yet they are also curiously reaffirmed by 
these pairs of opposites. This can make explanations about genetics still more complicated, 
such as in the choice of words and emphases and presentation of options.   
 
Figure 2.  Contradictory ideals 
 
1.  The first opposition is between social utility and personal worth: some people increasingly 
measure things and people for their utility, their commercial worth, and the way they 
contribute to or detract from efficient industry. Defective and disabled people in this light are 
seen as a net loss. Consumerism encourages people to expect the `perfect' child and to 
reject the `imperfect' fetus. As one US expectant couple said, `If he can't have a shot at 
being president we don't want him'.v  
  2.  The second dimension of opposing views relates to how a child with a genetic condition 
is seen as a case of disease to be rooted out, or as a person requiring social support. It is 
said that one reason for the rising divorce rate is that people are encouraged to expect 
higher rewards than ever before from close relationships as a haven from a hard world; 
mothers are exhorted to keep their children clean, safe, busy, stimulated and achieving.vi 
Mutual satisfaction within families is very highly valued, sometimes in consumer terms of 
parents and children expecting love to be expressed and rewarded - with gifts or high 
achievements.  
  3.  The second pair, of medical versus social concerns, also involves contradictions and 
reinforcements. Medical technology enables us to consider treating genetic patterns and 
selecting and terminating affected pregnancies. Some doctors now talk of `eliminating' a 
genetic defect. This can lead to less tolerance of disability and disfigurement, and higher 
expectations of treatments and cures. 
  4.  However, advanced technology also produces the aids and practical support which 
alleviate disabilities, and enable severely disabled people to lead fulfilled lives, integrated 
into society in ways that were previously not imagined. The contradictions arise in the ways 
technology is used - to exclude or to aid inclusion, to `eliminate' people with cystic fibrosis or 
to alleviate their condition and greatly extend their lives. `Integration' includes the global 
interest in disability rights, equal opportunities and tolerance or celebration of diversity, all of 
which can be aided by new technologies. 
  In the past few decades, possibilities have expanded, and values have become more 
diverse. So, for example, a child with Down's who might scarcely be noticed as different in 
many earlier societies can now be seen as either too great a misfit and burden on the state, 
or else as a highly valued, loving and loved person,vii either as a problem for health 
professionals to prevent or to treat (plastic, cardiac or ENT surgery, speech therapy, and so 
on), or as someone with much to offer when fully accepted into society.viii This acceptance 
can be aided by, for example, effective treatment of the heart conditions which many Down's 
children have, and which would be treated without question in other children. When 3 and 4 
complement one another, the same principles are applied equally to everyone, and there is 
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positive allowance for their differences.  
  Figure 2 shows how each of the four positions are pulling apart, yet can reinforce one 
another. Explaining the more severe genetic conditions to a child involves making sense of 
these contradictory forces - as far as possible. 
 
Timing and content  
 
Talking with children affected by a genetic disorder raises questions about what, when and 
how to tell them. It also involves listening to them and learning from them. Each child, and 
each child-parent relationship is unique. There is a limit to how helpful general ideas can be 
when talking with the individual child. So much depends on each relationship and on how 
freely and comfortably the child and adult talk about many other things. 
  It may be assumed that parents should have an orderly plan, gradually unfolding 
information as the child `develops'. Life is not like that. Some children understand long 
before the textbooks say that they can, others want to talk years after that `stage'. They ask 
unexpected questions at awkward times. Parents have to think of quick responses. One 
mother described how she was preparing her daughter, who had a mucopolysaccharide 
disorder, for major surgery. Her daughter asked `might I die?' The mother said that she 
hesitated, and she knew that the hesitation expressed far more than any follow-up words, so 
she decided to explain more than she had expected to. She worried that her young daughter 
would not cope well with the alarming news. The girl wrote a story about heaven, and 
although distressed at the time, she did seem to come to terms with the information.ix Apart 
from deciding to initiate discussions, adults are perhaps best advised in the timing and 
extent of their talking by the child's own questions and other cues. 
  Genetics involves words loaded with good and bad news: `bad genes' or `incorrect, 
impaired, wicked, naughty genes'. `Make it right or better', and so on. How can the `right' 
words be found? One way is to find out the words which the child or teenager uses, their 
questions and concerns, what they think their friends will or do think, their `ascertainable 
wishes and feelings' in the words of the Children Act 1989. This includes trying to sense how 
much they want to talk, when and whether they want to talk. Sharing complex and potentially 
distressing knowledge with people of any age is not easy. The main difficulties arise when 
adults try to `talk down' to children. 
  There are barriers to communication, especially in busy clinics, limitations of time and 
space, the lack of confidence and skill for some adults. There are problems of language with 
young children, people with learning difficulties and those who speak little or no English. 
Communication goes beyond words in tone of voice (optimistic, anxious, nervous or 
authoritarian) and in facial and body language which can be more expressive than words. 
Careful listeners pick up many cues from pauses and unspoken responses when giving and 
receiving information. More important than practical barriers are those of attitudes - 
prejudice that it is unwise or unkind to inform children or to trust them to make decisions, the 
`adult alliance' which assumes that adults must be in control and that to defer to children is 
to betray both this alliance and also children's reliance on adults. There is anxiety about 
intruding on children's privacy, or burdening them with unwanted anxieties.x,xi,xii How can 
reticent children be respected yet not excluded from discussions? Geneticists and 
counsellors may have 2 
different agenda from their clients, while assuming that they have the same concerns and 
order of priorities. All these barriers can affect discussion with adult clients. Attempts to 
create special skills for talking with children risk belittling and demeaning them. It is more 
worthwhile to practise sensitive ways of relating to each individual and clear appropriate 
ways of sharing information with them whatever their age or circumstances. 
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Competence 
 
Talking with children is frequently discussed in terms of assessing their competence to 
understand and to make decisions, such as to agree to a predictive genetic test. Some 
people advocate waiting until young people are 18, and `competent'. Others believe that 
some children want to have answers, to sort out misunderstandings, and sometimes to 
make decisions at a much younger age. There might seem to be a contradiction between 
the two views, raising the age for involving children in one case and lowering it in the other. 
They are reconciled when attention is paid to competence and it is not identified with a 
specific age.  
  Competence to make decisions means understanding the relevant information, having the 
wisdom or discretion to evaluate it in the light of one's best interests, and having the 
confidence to act with some independence and, if necessary, to take responsibility and 
accept blame. Few if any adults fully understand, or have complete discretion and 
indepednce, or want to have such extreme capacities. Competence is a relative not an 
absolute quality, and higher standards should not be expected from children than from 
adults, or from the parents who may decide for them. As mentioned earlier, genetics is 
complicated with many uncertainties. 
  Assessments of competence usually attend wholly to the child's capacities. Yet the context 
also needs to be assessed. For most patients. their competence partly depends on how 
clearly they are informed by health professionals, and how much their discretion and 
independence are respected by all concerned. Besides relationships between the 
individuals, the more general social context affects competence, such as how far experts 
understand the condition and treatment concerned, how new or risky the treatment is, how 
much time and space is allowed in the hospital for quiet discussion, the adults' beliefs about 
children's abilities, and many other factors.  
  This entails moderating assessments of the child in the light of the setting, for example 
whether the parents are used to sharing knowledge and decisions with the child or not. This 
moderating can be done positively or negatively. If the family tends to keep secrets and 
reserve power to the parents, a negative approach would assume that the child is immature 
and incompetent. The context would be reflected back into the assessor's view of the child. 
In a positive approach, the assessor would consider whether, despite the constraints and 
perhaps initial signals that the child does not and cannot want to be involved, this is not 
inevitably the case. Further discussion might clarify the child's wishes about being involved 
and the parents' willingness to reconsider. The context can be used either as a further 
constraint, or towards a more fair and careful assessment. The two approaches partly 
depend on whether the assessor works in psychological traditions of taking the individual as 
a somewhat static unit of analysis, or else sees people within a network of dynamic 
relationships and experiences. 
  When the competence of younger children is respected, they are treated with the same 
respect accorded to adults. 1) Adults cannot be tested against their will in order to inform or 
benefit others. 2) Their results are confidential. 3) An adult who very much wants to have a 
test which is often done for other people would not be refused.  
  The onus should be on those who want to set different standards for non-urgent 
interventions for children and for adults to justify this. Respect for children can expose them 
to the dangers of unwanted tests and interventions. It is important to check that they are not 
being unduly pressured to consent, and that they understand any risks and disadvantages - 
as in counselling adult patients. Many adults feel ambivalent about tests for serious 
conditions, and undertake them partly to inform their relatives. So to look for complete 
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conviction and freedom from family pressures in the child would be as unrealistic as to 
expect this in all adults. It is a question of a reasonable balance between the child deciding 
as an individual and as a member of a family, and this is not always easy to discern. 
  One great difference is when children either have or do not have knowledge based on 
personal experience, perhaps of a close relative having severe effects from the condition. In 
the latter case, however mature and intelligent they are, their understanding and wisdom are 
likely to be much more limited. Children with experience of serious illness or disability and 
treatment, even if they are well below average at school, can have high levels of 
competence concerning decisions about their health care. During interviews with children in 
schools for physical, sensory, emotional and learning difficulties, we have found children 
who are far more competent and aware than generalisations about their disabilities 
assume.xiii This finding has two important implications for talking with children about 
genetics. A much broader range of children may be able to be informed than has previously 
been supposed, and overly pessimistic descriptions and decisions about some genetic 
disorders must be reconsidered.    
  One unpublished description of a working class family, in which two younger children have 
severe genetic conditions, assumed that the elder sister aged 16 knew nothing about the 
disorders and should not be tested for her carrier status, because the family did not know 
the numbers of the affected chromosomes. But of course, the sister had profound 
experience of the effects of the disorders which were far more relevant to any decisions she 
might make than formal genetic knowledge would be. There are other valuable sources of 
knowledge, such as through the mass media, and their impact is discussed in the chapter 
on the social  
context. 
  Competence has four levels,xiv and the first two have no threshold of age or ability. One 
year olds can exchange information and views, resist or accept interventions, and react 
positively to explanation and persuasion and negatively to coercion. The levels are: 
  to be informed  
  to express views 
  to influence a decision 
  to be the main decider about proposed treatment or care. 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, and the Children Act 1989 
advocate the first three levels, the third one in accordance with the child's ability. Law Lords 
in the Gillick case, 1985,xv advocated the fourth level for children who can understand the 
relevant information, make wise decisions and are competent to do so in the judgement of 
the doctor treating them.xvi  
  Assessments of competence are difficult and contentious. There are no clearly agreed 
methods and criteria. Psychological testing tends to be biased by outdated developmental 
theories which under-estimate children's abilities. A solution to these problems is to assume 
that school aged children are competent to influence personal decisions affecting them, and 
that anyone who thinks that their informed views should not be taken seriously would have 
to demonstrate that the child is not competent.xvii 
 
Conclusion 
 
Some geneticists are concerned about the technical imperative, the belief that it is better to 
do something than nothing, better to act now than to wait and see. They have reservations 
about the rush to have genetic tests for later onset disorders for which there is no effective 
treatment or prevention. Some are concerned about pressures either to give alarming 
information to children, or to withhold it from them leaving them in frustrated uncertainty. 
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Because of these pressures, it is not helpful to make rules about specific ages when 
children should be informed or involved in decisions. So much depends on individual cases. 
  Instead of being a `how to' manual, this chapter is intended to help people to reflect on 
underlying questions and contradictions, and to think about what they know and do not know 
before deciding what to do. This is in the hope that by unravelling some of the questions, 
they may find it easier to respond to children's enquiries and to respect their interests. 
Through talking with children, we can learn from them how to do this, and we can reduce 
problems of coercion, fear, ignorance and resentment. Talking can help to clarify mutual 
understanding while, whenever possible, adults and children work together towards the best, 
or the least harmful, decision for that child. 
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Figure 2.  Contradictory ideals 
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